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FOCUS: Software engineering for ComplianCe
Software SyStemS embedded within hardware devices are increasingly prevalent in healthcare settings. They typically integrate information from devices and applications that collect, store, manipulate, and report clinical data. Authorities such as the US Food and Drug Administration (FDA) regulate software within hardware devices, and the EU has recently deemed stand-alone software to be a medical device (MD) in its own right (see the "Software as a Medical Device" sidebar). We expect that this will result in more health information systems (HISs) coming under regulatory scrutiny.
To achieve commercial success, the MD industry must produce efficient, reliable products from both business and regulatory standpoints. What people often don't recognize is that due to unforeseen faults or inadequate implementation in hospitals, MD software systems designed under tight regulatory controls might not actually be successful in the real-world clinical environment. Successful implementation requires a partnership between vendors, internal and external IT staff, and healthcare staff and involves unique relationships among stakeholders (or those who have a role in the system's administration) with varying needs, interests, and objectives. Healthcare staff and software engineers, for example, might have different expectations from software: the former might not have an understanding of some software and might oppose its use; the latter must be aware of specific development and implementation requirements for MDs, one of which is compliance.
Software systems management in healthcare settings varies significantly. High-profile cases such as the Therac-25 accidents 1 were influential in highlighting the need for regulatory control to minimize risk, but regulatory control alone won't ensure a system is successful or safe in the clinical environment. The industry must implement quality assurance (QA) and risk management structures for software. In hospitals, this can be done via structured clinical and healthcare (C&H) audit programs that incorporate risk management. Health Service Executive (HSE), Ireland, recently defined C&H audit as involving the comparison of "current practice to evidence based best practice in the form of standards, identifying areas for quality improvement and implementing changes to practice to meet the standards." 2 Consequently, C&H audit extends beyond clinical evaluation to other areas of healthcare such as software systems and staff management. In addition, clinical audit is mandatory in Ireland for doctors 3 and radiologists. 4 As software's increasing prevalence in hospitals increases software engineers' influence, it's imperative that software engineers understand and become involved in C&H audits.
developing H-QaP
One of this article's authors (Louise Reid) is the clinical audit facilitator for a group of hospitals, advising on the development of C&H audit programs. She recently led the development of a hospital quality assurance program (H-QAP), which aimed to ensure that HISs provide optimum benefit. Reid and her colleagues developed H-QAP through three stages:
• analyzing published research and standards, • reviewing relevant hospital inquiries, and • performing research in hospital settings.
We discuss here how the research output from each stage influenced H-QAP, showing that knowledge and intention are inadequate unless a strong governance structure exists.
Analyzing Published Research and Standards
To commence our study and to understand what currently exists in this arena, we systematically reviewed published research, along with software quality models and existing hospital quality standards that established requirements for high clinical information quality. Relevant legislation, such as HSE's Quality and Risk Management Standard, 2 the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPPA; www.hhs.gov/ocr/privacy), and the US FDA regulation 5 was fundamental to H-QAP content. We noted the importance of high-quality information and the risks associated with poor quality. As William DeLone and Ephraim McLean outlined, 6 information system success requires information quality, system quality, service quality, intention to use, use, and user satisfaction. The health industry must assure confidentiality and privacy. Additionally, it must proactively identify and manage risk prior to incidents. It must also reactively manage risk following incidents. H-QAP accounts for these needs. Because software is now classified as an MD, we reviewed software standards from a healthcare perspective. Vispi Shroff and colleagues stated that the software process model Capability Maturity Model Integrated (CMMI) 7 "was found to be the model that mapped most successfully to HSE's Quality and Risk Management Standard." 8 EU) different categories based on the potential effect they might have on patient health, but risk factors' definitions remain ambiguous; and • the proliferation of smartphone application stores has resulted in an increase in healthcare applications becoming readily available, although there are currently no regulatory or quality guidelines that they're required to follow.
Our analysis indicated that software systems should be managed within a broad QA program but didn't establish the existence of a validated hospital QA program. Such a program is necessary in assuring optimum and safe use of MDs in a hospital environment.
Reviewing Relevant Hospital Inquiries
Next, we analyzed the outcomes of five high-profile inquiries (see the "Hospital Inquiries" sidebar) to establish common themes, findings, and recommendations. Two of these reports focus on radiology and the others are seminal reports for healthcare in Ireland and the UK.
Each of the inquiries sought to establish causes of accidents, injuries, and near misses in the clinical field. Some findings focused specifically on software (for example, "Use of existing information systems must be optimized" and "Existing software systems significantly improve outcomes and minimize the effects when things go wrong"). Others didn't focus on software but were still relevant (for example, "Proactive and reactive risk management must be continually in place and continually reviewed standards must be set").
Following this review, we examined formal structures such as communication strategies, audit committees, and stakeholder analysis within H-QAP. Additionally, we used the DeLone and McLean model to measure HIS quality. Analyzing the inquiries gave us an understanding of factors that could lead to risk and breaches of patient safety. QA must involve all stakeholders interacting with the HIS and necessitates a culture of continuous quality improvement supported by people in governance roles. QA must be introduced in a structured, simple, manageable program as part of daily hospital activity. Staff must review findings regularly and change quickly in response to problems. Analyzing systems can provide corrections to process issues and consequently increase compliance. Hospitals can focus improvement on areas where quality is low or priority is high. Specifically, in H-QAP, information system quality is a specific focus in the topic selection layer (layer 4 in Figure 1 ), and it requires compliance with standardized care.
Performing Research in Hospital Settings
Using action research 10 and action inquiry, 11 we conducted our research in a hospital with 698 beds and 2,344 employees. We found that information systems were used in a variety of ways-by the whole hospital, by single departments, and in a personal context by clinicians. The hospital didn't have integrated electronic patient records (EPRs); rather, it used paper-based primary medical records. Using the DeLone and McLean Information Systems Success Model, we reviewed four systems: the emergency department software system, two clinical nurse
HoSPital inQuirieS
Our research reviewed the outcomes of five high-profile inquiries into circumstances where situations had gone seriously wrong in the clinical domain:
• In the Therac-25 accidents, between 1985 and 1987, patients received fatal overdoses of radiation. 1 • The Lourdes Hospital investigation looked at statistically below-average outcomes for procedures involving the removal of patients' uteruses. 2 • The Bristol inquiry focused on above-average death rates for children undergoing heart surgery. 3 • The Shipman inquiry looked at above-average death rates for patients of a general practitioner. 4 • The Tallaght review studied reasons leading to unopened general practitioner referrals and unread x-rays. 5 We sought to establish common themes in findings and recommendations. The inquiries highlighted the need for robust quality assurance programs to be in place to ensure that when things begin to go wrong in the clinical domain, the correct people are provided with the correct information and are empowered to address the situation. references specialist databases, and the hospital in-patient enquiry (HIPE) database.
Data quality varied widely. One system had 100 percent use of data and greater than 95 percent accuracy, whereas another had never been usedsome fields were 100 percent inaccurate, despite regular data input. We held interviews with key stakeholders, such as software engineers, radiographers, clinical nurse specialists, consultants, and data entry personnel. We came up with several key findings:
• many healthcare staff members have little understanding of data quality; • system developers often don't use software engineering techniques; • software such as Microsoft Excel gives healthcare staff members (who aren't qualified in software engineering and don't have an understanding of compliance) the capability to implement systems; • data reporting receives little emphasis, even when it's available; • healthcare staff are reluctant to use information where quality can't be assured; • when systems information isn't used, data quality deteriorates; • having a variety of stakeholders leads to different system expectations; • a lack of significant investment in software systems results in difficulties integrating old and new systems; • a lack of proactive management relating to compliance has resulted in a lack of compliance with standards;
• budget and staffing cuts have decreased the time and resources traditionally given to programs focused on quality; and • healthcare staff members often don't see software compliance as a priority.
Overall, our research demonstrated a need for a structured planning and maintenance program for HISs. In our case study, software engineers and IT vendors weren't always empowered to work in partnership with healthcare staff to assure systems' quality and safety. When systems were underutilized, data quality deteriorated, thus leading to a lack of confidence and, ultimately, to less use. Additionally, we noted inefficient use of existing systems, with staff "working around" processes. On the other hand, one system, HIPE, had high data quality and use. HIPE staff had a high standard of training. They used data, provided reports within six months with constant feedback, and had a local QA program in place.
By understanding current hospital situations, we identified existing quality processes' strengths and weaknesses and included a variety of approaches for information quality improvement in H-QAP. For any QA program to allow significant improvement, it needs to be simple and inform the decision to work with small sample sizes. Smaller sample sizes are more manageable, which facilitates faster turnaround of audits. Small sample sizes, particularly when reviewed regularly, can be very effective in highlighting process failures. H-QAP was no exception.
understanding H-QaP
H-QAP identifies problematic areas and ensures that they're revisited quickly. The most senior staff in the department ensure that a strong knowledgeable team, the audit committee, is put in place to regularly choose from the topic layer of H-QAP. They also ensure that no topic is overlooked. Each time a topic is chosen for review, they must engage people to provide a combination of authority and knowledge relevant to the topic, to ensure standards are in place and adhered to, and to see that required changes to structures or practice actually happen. This increases the likelihood of improved outcomes from systems, especially for patients. Each topic is reviewed regularly using the aforementioned small manageable sample sizes. Local governance and rapid escalation cater to domain complexity.
As Figure 1 shows, H-QAP consists of six implementation layers. The governance layer (layer 6 in Figure 1 ) establishes the relevant authorities and places those people in control of the program. They ensure that other layers are set up and reviewed.
Layer 5, the structure layer, requires a committee of key stakeholders that should include staff members who bring knowledge and influence, and, where software is under review, software engineers. This committee's responsibility is to develop and maintain a prioritized suite of quality protocols. Using the healthcare staff's clinical knowledge and software engineers' information systems knowledge, the committee can help ensure that the QA program maintains high priority, that risks of noncompliance are properly assessed and addressed, and that staff are aware of any changes that are required of them. If issues arise beyond committee or departmental control, they can be escalated to more senior hospital management.
The topic selection layer (layer 4) ensures that the QA program is holistic For any QA program to allow significant improvement, it needs to be simple and inform the decision to work with small sample sizes.
and based on patient requirements. Implementation of this layer requires the audit committee to choose topics weekly, prioritized based on noncompliance risk. Each topic increases in priority if it hasn't been reviewed in the previous six months. The quality layer (layer 3) recognizes that "good structure increases the likelihood of good process, and good process increases the likelihood of a good outcome." 12 Structure relates to the elements required to ensure compliance (such as equipment, software, and education policies). Process involves reviewing how things are done: Is policy being followed? Are software implementation processes effi cient? In this layer, relevant stakeholders must assess whether the desired patient or MD outcome is achieved.
In the case of an information management system, whose function is to manage a suite of policies, procedures, protocols, and guidelines (PPPGs), the desired outcome might be that staff members both have access to and actually access an up-to-date suite of PPPGs. To achieve this outcome, we must ensure that relevant structures are in place, such as a reliable information management system to store, update, and provide access to the PPPGs. The policies must actually exist. There must be an education program in place to ensure that staff are able to use the system; supports must be in place to assist staff when they run into diffi culties with the system-either through their own inexperience or through problems with the systems. Policies should also ensure that healthcare staff know what processes are required from them regarding writing, uploading, and downloading PPPGs to the system. Compliance with these processes must be audited to ensure that predefi ned outcomes are achieved. figUre 1 . H-QAP layers and protocols provide a structured approach to assuring quality in a department. When applied inward from layers 6 to 1, it ensures that the correct staff with the correct skills are driving a relevant, holistic program that achieves results in key areas.
Layer 2, the audit layer, is a derivative of recognized audit processes 10 and defi nes the audit's objectives and standards. For example, an organization might wish to improve its use of the information management system by ensuring that the system works correctly 100 percent of the time, that 100 percent of existing PPPGs are on the system, and that 100 percent of staff are using the system. This step collects data, measures it against the standard, changes practice (if required), and reaudits.
The rapid escalation layer (layer 1)
is the fi nal layer to be implemented. Healthcare staff's requirements will be managed and governed by those with capacity to do so. We implemented this layer using the Rapid Cycle Escalation process. 13 Here, materials such as posters (see Figure 2 ) provide essential education to staff members. Analyzing systems at each step corrects process issues and rules out circumstances beyond auditees' control. The Delone and McLean model scientifi cally checks whether performance is maximized. If not, software engineers, internal IT staff, or clinical staff must take responsibility to follow up and resolve issues relative to their respective fi elds.
implementing H-QaP
Our new understanding of the hospital's variety and complexity-each department having different sets of systems; standards for use of systems; risks associated with systems; and sets of demands, goals, objectives, and barriers to compliance-led us to apply H-QAP within departments rather than hospital-wide. Given that governance drives the program's quality, we incorporated specifi c structures, including a committee, communication strategy, and stakeholder analysis, to produce a team of relevant stakeholders. The most senior member in the department should drive this process.
Following a review of the picture archiving and communication system within the radiology department, we observed the net benefi t of the system, which translated to the patient receiving • a correct diagnosis within an acceptable time frame and • radiation in line with the ALARA (as little as reasonably achievable) principle to reduce risks such as cancer.
In this scenario, the radiographer uses the MD to take an image, links it to the correct patient, and stores it on the device. A consulting radiologist then reviews the image and helps inform a diagnosis. For a correct, safe diagnosis, several stakeholders must ensure quality:
• Software engineers must develop and maintain the MD correctly.
• Physicists must calibrate the MD to ensure it performs as it should (for example, it must provide the exact dose of radiation asked of it). • The radiographer must use the device correctly to take a clear image, link the image to the correct patient, and archive it.
• The radiologist must review the image and report a diagnosis on the correct patient to the correct treating physician in a timely fashion.
As this list shows, the system's desired outcome can only be achieved in a structured, holistic environment of different stakeholders. Each step must happen separately, and the risk of noncompliance must dictate the amount of effort applied.
Standardizing Processes
Through the implementation of H-QAP, we noted that radiologists rejected a significant number of shoulder x-rays, which meant radiographers had to retake many images. This increased patients' exposure to radiation, doubled the workload on clinical staff, and delayed diagnoses.
We examined the lack of quality under three headings: structure, process, and outcome. Our analysis showed that radiologists lacked standard requirements for shoulder x-rays they received, which was compounded by radiographers lacking standardization in what they provided. The system worked correctly from a technical perspective, but didn't achieve true success (correct diagnoses, a short time frame, ALARA achievement) because, due to lack of standardization, the information provided by the system was not 100 percent compatible.
To address this problem, team leaders for radiographers and radiologists developed policies for shoulder x-ray requirements (regarding angle, contrast, and view). The policies provided a standard technique for shoulder imaging, which in turn facilitated the standardization of the images. Regular audit of small numbers of shoulder x-rays quickly led to greater than 95 percent compliance. This, in turn, led to a reduction in rejected images because
• staff would collect data by recording the percentage of incorrectly taken x-rays; • staff would report data by means of information posters, formal department meetings, and so on; and • the audit committee would inform staff when reaudits were necessary.
We initially collected only a small, manageable sample size and implemented the Rapid Cycle Escalation Process 13 until we achieved our desired standard. Once we achieved the standard, we were then able to move back up the spiral, choosing other areas to investigate. w e hope to soon implement H-QAP in other departments (and, ultimately, to other hospitals). This will be the next phase of the action research project and will validate and further inform refinements to the program. With H-QAP, staff know about the escalation process prior to audit and have an opportunity to correct practice prior to governance and consequence. System use is better, data is more accurate, and staff are more cooperative in working together toward a unified goal. Due to the simplicity and regular reviewing of small sample sizes, process issues come to light quickly and are fixed rapidly. When there's indication of high risk, the hospital can examine the issue in greater detail with larger sample sizes. We have discussed the value of such a system with members of the national Clinical Audit 
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